The advent of information technology facilitates the geographic separation of production tasks, which is referred to as offshoring in international contexts and inshoring in domestic contexts. Although the literature on offshoring has flourished, the research regarding inshoring is limited. This paper examines inshoring on both empirical and theoretical fronts. Empirically, it shows that business support services have been increasingly sent to small localities for cost savings while being separated from their downstream industries, which have been consistently concentrated in large cities. Guided by empirical findings, a system of cities model is formulated to analyze inshoring and its welfare impact. The analysis shows that support workers are made better off, primarily because inshoring allows support workers to benefit from higher urban productivity without bearing urban costs. JEL: D2; D3; D6; J3; J6; L2; L8; O3; R1; R2; R3
Introduction
The advent of information technology, including the Internet, has allowed firms to source certain business support services from remote locations. For instance, law firms used to locate lawyers and legal typists in the same office, but now, the typists can type a lawyer's dictation miles away from where the lawyer works. This practice is termed offshoring when the job relocation crosses the national border and is called inshoring when it occurs domestically. 1 Both types of sourcing lead to geographic fragmentation of production, but they have a stark difference in nature: Labor is mobile domestically but immobile internationally. Thus, the impacts of inshoring and offshoring can differ. However, inshoring is understudied, even though the literature on offshoring has flourished.
This paper studies the inshoring of business support services (e.g., customer services, credit bureaus, telephone call centers, etc.), which are most influenced by progress of information technology. Empirically, the paper documents a shift in the geographic concentration of the business support services industry from large cities to small cities and rural areas as the industry has grown substantially faster in small skilled managers who execute managerial work and unskilled clerks who perform support work. The agglomeration of managers in cities creates knowledge spillovers, which attract firms to cities. However, firms face a trade-off between labor costs and remote communication friction, and this is a key element of the model. On the one hand, clerks in rural areas demand less wage compensation, as commuting costs and housing prices are low. On the other hand, these clerks have lower marginal productivity than their 1 Inshoring includes both outsourcing and in-house sourcing within the same country.
urban counterparts, due to the friction caused by remote communication. New technologies that lower the friction can increase clerks' marginal productivity in rural areas. As a consequence, firms initiate inshoring and send support jobs to rural areas and away from managerial jobs. Since labor is mobile, clerks relocate in response to the labor demand shift, and this leads to separation between clerks and managers.
The most interesting theoretical finding concerns welfare impact. The paper shows that a reduction in communication friction leading to inshoring necessarily benefits unskilled clerks but has an ambiguous welfare impact on skilled managers. Overall, inshoring unambiguously decreases the welfare inequality between the two types of workers. While details will be explained later, the basic reason for this is that inshoring allows clerks to benefit from higher urban productivity without bearing urban costs.
This paper is related to several strands of literature that consider geographic fragmentation of production. In international trade, a large volume of research concerns offshoring, which arises when falling transportation or communication costs motivate firms to disintegrate production and send certain jobs overseas to take advantage of factor price disparities. A consequence of this sourcing practice is growing vertical (functional) specialization in which countries increasingly specialize in one part of a good's production process (Hummels et al., 2001) . Much research effort is devoted to analysis of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, in response to the offshoring of standardized unskilled labor-intensive jobs to developing countries. Although recent research offers more sophisticated views (e.g., Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Robert-Nicoud, 2008), the literature typically predicts that offshoring brings efficiency gains but enlarges wage inequality and worsens the position of unskilled workers in developed countries (Feenstra, 1998; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) . 2 This welfare implication of offshoring is in sharp contrast to my model's prediction that inshoring benefits the unskilled. The distinction is due to the difference in labor mobility. Workers are mobile domestically but immobile internationally, and thus a labor demand shift can yield different outcomes.
In a cross-city analysis, Duranton and Puga (2005) pioneer the theoretical research, for which they assume mobile labor across cities, occupations and sectors and consider an endogenous relationship between 2 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) assume that unskilled tasks are differentiated and complementary, and those that are difficult to offshore will be retained. Thus, when firms send those tasks that can be easily offshored to lowcost countries, they also generate a productivity effect analogous to a labor-augmenting technological progress for domestic unskilled workers. Therefore, these workers can benefit from offshoring under certain parametric restrictions. Robert-Nicoud (2008) adopts a New Economic Geography model to analyze both the effects of falling transportation and communication costs. In that model, the former motivates firms to move their entire organizations to the developing country, but the latter allows firms to geographically separate routine and complex tasks in different nations. Falling communication costs do shift the routine tasks to the developing country and narrow the international wage gap. However, this should not be viewed as detrimental to the developed country. Lower transportation costs can lead to dispersion and result in convergence, which is least favorable to the workers in the developed country. Falling communication costs make the agglomeration outcome remain sustainable at a lower transportation cost because the ease of coordination provides firms with greater incentive to keep complex tasks in the developed country to benefit from agglomeration. local productivity and industrial agglomeration. The final goods producers can save on communication costs by integrating managerial and manufacturing functions at the same location. In addition, their managerial and manufacturing units benefit from proximity to diversified business services providers and sector-specific intermediate suppliers, respectively. Nevertheless, agglomeration results in higher living costs that drive up wages. Consequently, high communication friction necessitates the integration of managerial and manufacturing functions at the same location, and cities feature sectoral specialization in equilibrium. On the contrary, low communication friction facilitates separation of the two functions in different places, and cities feature functional specialization. The empirical literature supports the above framework and results. Manufacturers often contract out for specialized business services (Abraham and Taylor, 1996) . This propensity increases with city size (Ono, 2007) , and particularly, those with management headquarters in large cities are more likely to use their headquarters to contract out for the local business services (Ono, 2003) . Vernon Henderson and his co-authors further examine the determinants of firms' decisions to geographically separate headquarters from production and to locate the headquarters. Aarland et al. (2007) point out that firms that separate the managing headquarters from production tend to be large corporations, perform manufacturing operations, have multiple production units, and/or produce diversified products. More importantly, firms operating in small cities are more likely to establish stand-alone headquarters in larger cities. Henderson and Ono (2008) discover that in locating the headquarters, manufacturers value the variety of local business services as well as proximity to production facilities. The former is particularly important to those who establish geographically stand-alone headquarters. Davis and Henderson (2008) find that both urbanization and localization economies are important to attracting headquarters: Diversified local business services and plentiful nearby headquarters both matter. These empirical findings are generally consistent with Duranton and Puga's (2005) research of functional specialization. This paper extends cross-city analyses of geographic production fragmentation. It is closest to Duranton and Puga (2005), as it also embodies functional specialization, but the main difference is that this paper considers heterogeneous workers and one single sector to elaborate welfare impact, while their study assumes multiple industries and homogeneous workers to focus on changes in cities' industrial structures.
Another key distinction from their work is the modeling of the nature and benefit of separating production activities. Most previous research concerns why manufacturers locate their headquarters in large cities away from the production plants in small towns. Since a plausible motivation is the benefits to headquarters from access to diversified business services providers, such as financial, legal and marketing services firms, a New Economic Geography framework carrying urbanization economy through a monop-olistic competition structure is popular, although Davis and Henderson (2008) additionally incorporate localization economy of headquarters' agglomeration in their model. My paper, instead, studies why firms in the urban sector, i.e., the business services providers treated as a whole, send their back offices, which perform standardized business support services without the need for face-to-face communications, to small localities away from the front offices, which require face-to-face interactions and are in large cities. In this regard, a system-of-cities framework with localization economy within the urban sector can deliver a suitable and simple analysis, and the empirical evidence presented in this paper lends support to the framework.
There is a different line of research that analyzes functional specialization within the city. Ota and Fujita (1993) demonstrate that if communication costs are low, firms will locate their front offices, which need face-to-face inter-firm interactions, in the city center and the back offices, which can telecommute, in the far suburbs. With empirical evidence, the theory of Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2009) further shows that in addition to lower communication costs, population growth also plays a critical role in shaping functional specialization within the city. Undoubtedly, inshoring of business support services can also occur within a city. Nevertheless, research on inshoring across cities is at least equally as important; since sourcing business support services from foreign countries is feasible and overwhelming, sourcing the services domestically from small localities can be pronounced as well. This paper also relates to the emerging literature on urban sorting. Cities differ greatly in the share of skilled workers with a bachelor's degree. 3 This outcome of skill sorting is partly due to selection, since labor is mobile. Large cities tend to be "skilled cities", which have a greater proportion of skilled workers than other cities (Bacolod et al., 2009; Combes et al., 2008) ; agglomeration raises firms' productivity and increases housing prices, and thus it leads to selection (Behrens et al., 2010) . Interestingly, the degree of skill sorting has increased over the past 30 years. Skilled cities have experienced a greater increase in the share of skilled workers (Berry and Glaeser, 2005 ) and a faster growth in housing prices (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004; Shapiro, 2006) . As a priori, the increased sorting can be supply push, which involves increased supply of skilled workers in the skilled cities for desirable local amenities, or demand pull, which features skill-biased technological changes and labor demand shifts. One way to compare the relative importance of these two explanations is to scrutinize cross-city variation in the skill premium. The recent literature (e.g., Beaudry et al., 2006; Berry and Glaeser, 2005; Liao, 2010; Moretti, 2011) shows that the skilled cities have also had a larger increase in the skill premium, which supports a demand-pull theory. explore sources of skill-biased technological changes and mechanisms leading to increased urban sorting by skills. Particularly, Liao (2010) , which is a companion to this paper, draws a connection between increased sorting and inshoring. 4 In the model, production involves differentiated unskilled tasks, and firms inshore those tasks for which inshoring is cheaper than performing the tasks in-house. In large cities, the firms are more inclined to inshore unskilled tasks because local unskilled workers require higher wages to compensate for expensive urban housing. Since inshoring substitutes the local unskilled and complements the skilled, the large cities are more skilled in equilibrium. When communication costs decrease, the firms will inshore a greater variety of unskilled tasks. This skill-biased technological change increases the relative demand for the skilled workers in large cities. The changes in wage premiums pull in the skilled and push out the unskilled, so there is increased skill sorting. This paper is in line with Liao (2010), as it also shows the connection between increased sorting and inshoring/functional specialization.
However, this paper is different because it provides systematic empirical analysis, and it simplifies firms' organizations to focus on welfare analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical findings. Section 3 introduces the model and provides theoretical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Findings
This section presents empirical findings, and the presentation is organized into six parts. The first part includes an introduction to main data sources and data construction. The second part is an examination of growth and geographic concentration of the industry performing inshored business support services.
The third part identifies the downstream industries of the support services and studies where they are.
The fourth part assesses the overall degree of geographic separation between the support services and downstream industries, and the fifth part explores why small cities attract the business support service industry. The last part concerns geographic separation of business support workers from other workers and documents patterns of internal migration. 4 Liao (2010) actually shows that both inshoring and computerization can strengthen the skill sorting. That paper first documents five stylized facts that include larger increases in the skill level, housing prices, and skill premium and greater adoption of inshoring and computerization in the skilled cities. A model is introduced to explain these facts. In addition to agglomeration economies and technology-skill complementarity, the model also assumes differentiated unskilled tasks, each featuring different levels of inshoring friction and computerization requirements.
Data Sources
The County Business Patterns (CBP) provide annual establishment-level microdata on establishment and employment counts as well as payroll, and the data are released in the form of cell counts by employmentsize class, industry, and location. To meet nondisclosure requirements, CBP withholds information under certain circumstances. Stevens (2002, 2004) 
Growth and Geographic Concentration of Business Support Services
The industry of interest here is Business Support Services (BSS), NAICS 5614, which is defined in the North America Industrial Classification System as an industrial group that "comprises establishments engaged in performing activities that are ongoing routine, business support functions that businesses and organizations traditionally do for themselves", and it is selected for the following reason. 6 A main theme of this paper is the inshoring of day-to-day routines of businesses, and therefore, NAICS 56 is potentially the pool of industries that can be scrutinized. However, to reflect the inshoring most influenced by the advent of IT and the interest or concern of the American public on offshoring versus inshoring of lower-skilled office occupations, the study would not cover industries such as logistics, protection services, cleaning, etc., that have a local context and industries such as financial planning that are rather skilled.
In addition, the study would not cover industries like travel arrangement and personal services that also largely engage in serving private households. Taking all these into consideration, the appropriate industry for the purpose of the study is the BSS.
The BSS consists of various sub-industries, including Document Preparation Services, Telephone
Call Centers, Business Service Centers, Collection Agencies, Credit Bureaus, etc. Since many U.S.
industries rely on these services, the BSS has been a large and fast-growing industry. It had about 780,000 employees in 2006. Its employment size is comparable to the broadly defined automotive industry (i.e., the aggregation of NAICS 3361, 3362 and 3363) and is large compared to the number of offshored service jobs. 7 Given that the impact of the automotive industry on urban economies is widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g., Feyrer et al., 2007) , and the concern over services offshoring is overwhelming, the importance and influence of the BSS can be non-negligible and deserve attention.
The BSS is a fast-growing industry. It grew by 21% between 1998 and 2006, while U.S. total employment only grew by 11% during the period. The BSS is a "low-skilled" industry. In 2000, only 16% of its workers had a bachelor's degree, while 23% of American workers had the degree. The BSS workers have a lower educational profile because the majority of them are in the Office and Administrative Support occupations (the SOC definition). These occupations generally do not require a bachelor's degree, as only 14% of American workers in these occupations have it. 6 One might question whether BSS data examined here relate to inshoring or outsourcing. The NAICS definition of BSS might appear to be outsourcing, but the data are, in fact, related to inshoring because of the design of Economic Census, the primary source of CBP's industrial classification. The Economic Census is conducted on an establishment basis, and each establishment is assigned a separate industry classification based on its primary activity and not on that of its parent company. Thus, BSS establishments identified in CBP can include a customer service center directly owned by a bank. 7 The broadly defined automotive industry had about 1,007,000 workers in 2006. For the number of offshored services jobs, although the literature does not have a good estimate, Forrester Research, Inc. reported that 315,000 services jobs had been shifted offshore by the end of 2003. 8 The year 1998 was the first year that CBP identified BSS because the industry was not defined by the industrial classification system until 1997. The LQ is a ratio that measures geographic concentration of economic activity in the area of interest. Typically, the LQ of industry  at location  is defined as
where   is location 's share of the country's industry  employment, and   is location 's share of U.S. total employment. Here, the geographic union of all localities in the same location-size class is considered as a single "location." Thus, the LQ in Table 1 is the location-size class's share of U.S. BSS employment relative to the size class's share of U.S. total employment. The higher the ratio, the higher the concentration. If every location has an LQ equal to 1, then the geographic distribution of the activity is even across locations. As the table shows, the overall growth of BSS employment was considerably higher for localities in smaller size classes. While the growth rates were only 4.8% for the ten largest cities (i.e., metropolitan areas) and 8.9% for other cities with more than one million people, the growth rate was 39.6% for cities with a population between a quarter million and one million. For the smallest size class, which includes cities with less than a quarter million people as well as rural areas, the growth rate was 41.2%. On the contrary, the two largest size classes had faster growth in U.S. total employment. As a result, the geographic concentration of BSS greatly shifted from large cities to small localities during this eight-year period. Particularly, smaller cities with a population between a quarter and one million had already become the locations with the highest BSS concentration, and the ten largest cities had already featured a weak presence of BSS.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Over the eight-year period, the pattern of the shift in the geographic concentration of BSS had been consistent, as shown in Figure 1 . The LQs of the two largest location-size classes bear clear downward trends, but the LQs of the two smallest classes exhibit evident upward trends.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Downstream Industries of BSS: Who and Where
Concerning geographic fragmentation of production, this research examines input-output flows using 1997
Benchmark I-O Accounts to identify the downstream industries (DIs) of BSS and then studies where the 8 The result is not sensitive to the selection of the size classes' threshold values.
DIs are. To facilitate the identification, define industry 's intensity ratio of BSS usage as
where     and     can be interpreted as the intensity of using BSS services of industry  and all U.S. industries, respectively. Thus, industries with an intensity ratio greater than one are considered the DIs because they use BSS more intensively.
In examining the input-output flows, the BSS intensity ratio is first calculated for each 3-digit NAICS industry. If within a 2-digit NAICS sector some of the 3-digit industries have similar ratios, then they are aggregated to one, whose intensity ratio is further calculated. The intensity ratio, as well as      and     , are reported in Table 2 . 9 Except for two 3-digit industries, all the reported industries are on the 2-digit level. The first ten industries listed in the table had an intensity ratio greater than one. They acquired 80% of BSS services used as intermediate goods, but only accounted for 47% of the nation's total value added. Thus, the ten industries are considered the main users of BSS. In the rest of this paper, they are treated as a whole, which is referred to as the DIs.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 reports DIs' employment growth and changes in LQ between 1998 and 2006 by location-size class. Unlike BSS, the DIs were consistently more concentrated in larger cities, and the LQs of the DIs remained constant over the period. This result was in stark contrast to BSS's change in geographic concentration.
[Insert Table 3 here] 9 An alternative measure of industrial upstream-downstream ties in previous research, such as Ellison and Glaeser (1997), was also calculated for every industry listed in Table 2 . The results are unreported. This alternative measure takes the form      , where    is again the value of BSS services used by industry  as intermediate goods, and   is the value of the industry's output. The correlation between that alternative measure and the intensity ratio is greater than 098. However, the intensity ratio is preferred because unlike Ellison and Glaeser (1997) , who only single out the industry having the strongest upstream-downstream connection with the industry of interest, this research needs to identify multiple downstream industries of BSS. The intensity ratio can provide an objective cutoff-1-above which the upstream-downstream relationship may be considered strong. Tables 1 and 3 2010) demonstrate that when studies consider the coagglomeration of two industries, the Index's formula can be reduced to a special form. In the context of this research, the special form can be written as The results on BSS and DIs in the above three subsections clearly indicate geographic separation between these back-and front-office activities. Particularly, the geographic concentration of BSS is increasingly shifted toward small localities, while the concentration of DIs remains in large cities. Given that the employment size of BSS is comparable to the automotive industry, the significant shift of BSS locations would have a non-negligible impact on urban economies.
Geographic Separation of BSS and DIs
  = X  (  −   ) (  −   ) 1 − X   2  where   is
What Attracts BSS to Small Localities
This section examines why BSS employment grows substantially faster in smaller localities, using the approach below. Firstly, a simple regression that indicates a negative relationship between BSS growth and location population is performed, and then, a process of adding explanatory variables is applied to identify the underlying reason for small localities to attract BSS. The logic behind this approach is the following. The estimated negative relationship from the simple regression is subject to omitted variable bias; there may be an omitted variable-for example, the initial wage rate-that is correlated with both BSS growth and location population. Because of the omission, the influence on BSS growth that should be rightly attributed to the wage rate is picked up by location population. If the inclusion of this previously omitted variable does eliminate the impact of location population on BSS growth from the regression, then what accounts for BSS growth is in fact the initial wage rate, which is positively correlated with location population, but not the location population itself. In other words, the lower wage rate is the underlying reason for smaller localities to attract BSS.
To identify the underlying reason, three sets of control variables are included to assess three competing hypotheses. The first includes the percentage of location employment in DIs in 1998 and the logarithmic change of DI employment between 1998 and 2006, examining whether BSS growth is tied to the proximity of the DIs, which use BSS more intensively than do other industries. 10 If information technologies have not eliminated the importance of distance between BSS and DIs, then a location with higher geographic concentration of DIs or faster DI growth should also have faster BSS growth during the wave of BSS inshoring.
The second set concerns local specialization, diversity, and average establishment size. These three variables are often included in the industrial growth literature (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1992) . However, the main purpose here is not on growth determinants of BSS but rather on whether taking into consideration these controls can explain away the negative relationship between location population and BSS growth, thus identifying a reason for BSS to grow faster in small localities. Here, specialization is measured by the 10 The percentage of city employment in DIs is equivalent to the LQ of DIs up to a scale.
percentage of the location's employment in BSS, and diversity in location  is measured by the formula below:
where   indicates industry 's share of location 's total employment. This measure is the sum of the squares of the location's employment shares for all industries except BSS multiplied by negative one. A higher value indicates greater diversity. The last variable relates to the average establishment size of BSS in the location. Specifically, it is the number of establishments per one hundred employees in BSS. The higher the value, the smaller the average establishment size.
The third set of variables relates to local labor market conditions, including the average wage, the change in manufacturing employment relative to the level of total employment, and labor suitability measures. Documented in various sources, a primary reason for offshoring is to access low-cost labor.
This is also possibly a key motivation behind inshoring. In fact, the correlation coefficients of the wage rate with BSS growth and location population are -0.43 and 0.52, respectively, suggesting wages as a potentially important source of the omitted variable bias.
The change in manufacturing employment relative to the level of total employment is also worth consideration. The U.S. manufacturing sector is declining, and the displaced workers may seek employment in other sectors. In those localities with manufacturing decline, the workers released from that sector might be a source of growth for new industries. Given that many of the small localities in the U.S. are manufacturing towns, sectoral labor movement from the declining manufacturing sector might contribute to the faster growth of BSS in small localities. Furthermore, the manufacturing decline might affect local wages, and taking it into account can prevent potential bias on the coefficient estimate for the average wage.
Additionally, a more suitable labor force composition may attract BSS. Following Glaeser and Kerr (2009), two measures of labor suitability are used. 11 The first is defined as
where the subscript  indicates the category of educational attainment and the subscript  indicates the
is the percentage of BSS national employment in category , and    is the percentage of location 's total employment in category . Multiplying the summation by negative one, a higher value indicates a more suitable labor force for BSS. The second measure uses the same formula as Eq.
(1) except that the subscript  indicates the occupation instead. Table 4 [Insert Table 4 here] According to column 1, location population has a significantly negative impact on BSS employment growth. As explained, this negative association may be due to omitted variable bias, and including the three sets of control variables introduced earlier into the regressions allows us to identify which one of the three hypotheses is most plausible in explaining this negative relationship.
Lower wages may be the main reason for small localities' success in attracting BSS. As shown in columns 2 and 3, including the DI concentration and growth makes little difference to the coefficient of location population, and adding measures of specialization, diversity, and the number of establishments per one hundred employees in BSS does not have much impact on this coefficient either. However, the inclusion of the initial average wage in column 4 eliminates the impact of location population almost entirely, and the remaining effect is insignificant. The wage rate has a significant negative impact on BSS growth. 12 Column 5 adds three additional variables. It includes the change in manufacturing employment between 1992 and 1997, relative to 1992 total employment. 13 It also includes two labor suitability measures, which are based on the 2000 census data. 14 The inclusion of these variables is to observe whether there are any reasons, other than lower wages, for BSS to grow faster in smaller localities and to prevent possible endogeneity of the local average wage. The added variables result in minimal changes in the regression outcome. Note that the labor suitability measures in column 5 might be endogenous, as the arrival of BSS may influence the occupation and education compositions of the labor force. To ease the concern on the reverse causality, the regression is repeated, and the result is in 12 As the regressions use the initial year's wage rate, reverse causality (arrival of BSS subsequently affects local wage level) would not have a role. 13 The change in manufacturing employment between 1998 and 2006 was also tried. Its coefficient estimate was insignificant, and the adjusted  2 decreased. Thus, this variable is not included in the paper.
14 For the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 Census, the lowest level of geographic entity is PUMA. Each PUMA unit must comprise an area with at least 100,000 inhabitants. Thus, for columns 5, 10, 11 and 12 where PUMS data are used in the regressions, micropolitan areas are not included because these areas' populations are mostly below 50,000 and are far smaller than the minimum population of PUMAs. The results in Table 4 In summary, the results in Table 4 suggest that BSS grows faster in small localities mainly because support workers are less expensive there. This finding is consistent with the common view that the primary purpose of inshoring/offshoring is to reduce costs.
Separation of Support Jobs/Workers from Others
Although BSS is a large industry, one might wish to see evidence of the geographic fragmentation of production in a broader scope. Therefore, IPUMS data are examined in this subsection, and the examination also offers an indication of geographic separation of the office and administrative support workers from others. The term "office and administrative support" is abbreviated to "support," hereafter. The results are presented below. Table 5 The geographic concentration of the support jobs was shifted toward smaller localities, and the change within the NAICS 5 sector was more pronounced. Consequently, there is geographic separation between the back-and front-office functions.
[Insert Table 5 here] Table 5 also indicates geographic separation of the support workers from non-support workers. To assess the overall degree of the separation, two measures of segregation are used. The first is the dissimilarity index:
here   and  refer to the number of the BSS and DIs' (or NAICS 5's) support workers in location  and the country, respectively, and where   and  refer to the number of non-support workers in location  and the country, respectively. This index indicates the share of support workers who would have to relocate to achieve an even distribution across localities.
The second measure is a correlation index proposed by Kremer and Maskin (1996) . Denoted by , this index is defined as
where   and  refer to BSS and DIs' (or NAICS 5's) total employment in location  and the country, respectively, and Π  and Π refer to support workers' share of   and  , respectively. In addition, the 95% confidence interval for this index is
where  is the total number of locations. This index normalizes the variance of support workers' share The support jobs brought to small localities may be filled by the locals or migrants from other places.
Although the former would be an important source, the latter can be significant as well. Americans are highly mobile, and employment opportunity is an important determinant of internal migration (Greenwood, 1997). Table 6 provides the regression results. The first two columns involve binary models and report the marginal effects, and the last four columns concern multinomial models and present the relative risk ratios. For each dummy variable, its marginal effect in the binary model is the change in the probability of migrating when its value increases from zero to one, and its relative risk ratio in the multinomial model is the change in the probability of migrating to a location whose population is of the corresponding size, over the probability of not migrating when the value of the dummy variable increases from zero to one.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The key results are reported in the first three rows, which concern the impact of living in a large city, the effect of being in the period between 1997 and 2007, and the influence of the interaction term of these two variables on migration, respectively. Model 1 suggests that for non-support workers, the status of living in a large city reduced the probability of migration by 1.7% during the period of 1987-1997, and that status significantly induced an additional 0.7% reduction in migration probability during 1997-2007.
However, Model 2 shows that although the status of living in a large city also significantly reduced the migration probability of support workers by 1.7% between 1987 and 1997, that status did not significantly induce any further decrease in the probability during the next ten years. As a result, support workers would have become more likely to move out of large cities relative to non-support workers.
Model 3 indicates that non-support workers were 1.083 times more likely to migrate to large cities and 1.197 times more likely to move to small localities during 1997-2007 than in 1987-1997. The first number is actually statistically insignificant, and the second number is just slightly higher than the first.
Model 4 shows that support workers were not significantly more likely to migrate to large cities during 1997-2007 than in 1987-1997, but they became 1.712 times more likely to move to small localities. The relative risk ratio of migrating to small localities is substantially higher than that of migrating to large cities. Thus, support workers have become much more likely to migrate to small localities. This pattern is in stark contrast to the migration pattern of non-support workers.
Overall, the four regression models in Table 6 indicate that support workers have become more likely to leave large cities and migrate to small localities compared to non-support workers. The regressions additionally control various individual characteristics. Generally, older people are less likely to migrate.
College graduates are more mobile; they have a higher relative risk of migrating to a small locality over staying put compared to non-college graduates, and their relative risk ratio for migrating to a large city is even greater. Individuals who are not white are less likely to move, and they are much less likely to move to small localities than whites. Singles are more likely to move, and people with children are less mobile. These additional outcomes are consistent with the previous literature.
Theoretical Analysis
This section examines the impact of inshoring using a simple system of cities model in which large institutions, called city developers, organize cities. Introduced by Henderson (1974) and widely adopted in the literature, the function of the city developers serves to internalize local production externalities and ensure an efficient market outcome. Vernon Henderson, as well as other researchers, argues that assuming city developers is realistic, at least for developed countries. With a key element being that firms face a trade-off between labor costs and remote communication friction, the model presented in this section delivers the paper's empirical findings and has implications for welfare inequality. Nevertheless, the implications can also be generated by other modeling approaches, such as self-organization. This point will be discussed later.
Model
For simplicity, assume a large economy that can facilitate a continuum of cities. The model economy has one unit of workers;  units of them are managers, and the rest are clerks. The workers first choose where to live and then inelastically demand one unit of residential land and participate in the local labor market. Their preferences are linear in consumption of a numeraire good.
The producers of the numeraire good are in cities. 15 They use a Cobb-Douglas production technology that is constant returns to scale in two inputs: managers and clerks. Assuming perfect competition, each city has a representative producer with the production function:
where  and  denote the number of managers (skilled workers) and clerks (unskilled workers) in the city, respectively, and   denotes the number of remote clerks who are outside the city and perform inshored clerical work for the producer. Inshoring is subject to a communication friction: Only a  proportion of the work can be delivered. The larger the proportion, the better the technology.
The capital letter  in the above production function denotes the level of knowledge spillovers, which is a function of the total number of managers in the city:
where  indicates the strength of the spillovers. Two assumptions are made here. First, the knowledge spillovers only exist locally, as is assumed in a large volume of theoretical literature. 16 Second, only managers-the skilled workers-can contribute to the spillovers. This also appears in other theoretical works, such as Fujita and Thisse (2003) and Glaeser and Ponzetto (2010), as an assumption or equilibrium outcome. The empirical literature lends support to this as well. The research by Acemoglu and Angrist 15 This has to be true in equilibrium because productivity comes from knowledge spillovers that are unavailable in rural areas with a size of measure zero. To minimize model description, this is treated as an assumption. 16 Although one might suspect that the advent of information technology could jeopardize this assumption's validity, the empirical literature, such as Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) , has found that local context of knowledge spillovers may have remained important because IT and face-to-face communication are complements but not substitutes. Regarding land use, there is an infinite supply of land on a real line on which monocentric cities can be set up. Each city has a central business district (CBD) wherein the production takes place, and residential land is spread out evenly on both sides of the CBD. Workers living in the city pay rent for the one unit of land that they occupy, and they commute between home and the CBD. Let  denote the round-trip commuting cost per unit of land in terms of the numeraire. Let  denote the city population.
The city edges are 2 units away from the CBD, and the total commuting cost in the city is
where  indicates a home location. Thus,  is the commuting cost for the worker who lives  units away from the CBD. The total commuting cost (i.e., the city's total congestion cost) increases with city size.
Rural areas are defined as land outside the cities. Because rural areas are inexhaustible and their size is of measure zero, workers living there pay zero rent and zero commuting costs.
Competitive developers can set up cities with zero sunk costs because rural rent is zero. The developers own the cities' land and earn rent. They guarantee utility levels to attract residents, and they promise factor prices to entice firms and production factors. Being the superintendents of cities, they are able to achieve the guaranteed utility levels and factor prices by choosing the quantities of all factor inputs, including local workers, available to the cities and offering a transfer denoted by  to resident managers who contribute to local knowledge spillovers. 17 The developers aim to maximize total rent received from the residents, net of total expenditure on transfer payments. This profit maximization problem will be explained in more detail later.
One limitation of system of cities models is that they work only in a range of parameter values, and virtually all researchers focus on symmetric equilibria. To focus on the interesting case, the model of this paper makes three assumptions about parameter values:
. These assumptions ensure that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric and has a finite city size and positive welfare for both types of workers. Secondarily, if   1 3 and   − 1− are additionally assumed, the welfare of managers will be higher than that of clerks.
Let   ,   and   denote the wages of city managers, city clerks and rural clerks, respectively. 18 Let  denote the total number of cities endogenously formed. Then, the equilibrium and the types of equilibrium outcomes can be defined as follows:
The equilibrium consists of an allocation (      ), a price vector (        ) and a transfer  and satisfies the following conditions: (i) workers maximize utility, (ii) producers maximize profit, (iii) city developers maximize profit, and (iv) the market clearing conditions below hold: 
Equilibrium Analysis
Workers are indifferent as to where to live in equilibrium. Therefore, the urban cost of living, which is the sum of commuting costs and rent, must be the same everywhere within the city. Given a population  , the urban cost of living is Urban cost of living =  2 because the worker living at the city edge pays zero rent and 2 commuting cost. By the indifference condition, the rent is  (2 − ) for land  units away from the CBD. Thus, the total rent earned by 18 The remote clerks who perform inshored clerical work all will choose to live in rural areas because they want to save on commuting costs and rent. Thus, the subscript r stands for "rural" in fact. 19 The second condition implies that managers all live in cities because firms choose to put all managerial jobs there for the sake of knowledge spillovers. The third condition implies that clerks who perform inshored work all live in rural areas because they want to save on commuting costs and rent. the city developer is Total rent = 2
In light of Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), the profit maximization problem of the representative city developer can be written as
where   and   are the levels of the indirect utility of resident managers and clerks, respectively; the three wage equations on   ,   and   are derived from the firm's optimization problem; and  ∈ [0 1].
The intuition of this developer's problem is as follows. The five equality constraints are the "no-incentiveto-leave constraints." To attract managers and clerks to live in the city, the developer must guarantee each of these two types of residents a utility level, such that the residents will not do better if they live elsewhere. To facilitate production, the developer must also guarantee factor prices-the wage rates-to entice firms and all types of production factors, including the tradable remote clerical services provided by rural clerks, as well as local managers and clerks. The guaranteed wage rates have to be low enough that firms are willing to locate in the city and high enough that the three types of workers are willing to provide work for the city's firms. Being the superintendent of the city, the developer can achieve the guaranteed levels of utility and wages by choosing ,  and   and by deciding . Through competition among developers, the guaranteed levels are equal across cities, and   ,   ,   ,   and   are, in fact, the national levels of utility and wages; the representative competitive developer simply takes these levels as given in making its decision.
In equilibrium, the developer earns zero profit because of free entry. Using this fact, together with the first-order conditions of the developer's problem and the market clearing conditions (Eq. 2), the equilibrium can be solved. The equilibrium maximizes social welfare, which is equal to aggregate output minus aggregate commuting cost.
Proposition 1
The equilibrium is the optimum.
Proof. In Appendix A.
As a standard feature of the system of cities model with competitive developers, the equilibrium is optimal. This is because the city developers internalize the knowledge spillovers-the externality-through transfer payments; thus, the First Welfare Theorem holds.
The rest of this section scrutinizes how decreased communication friction (a higher  ) leads to geographic fragmentation of production and affects welfare. The analysis begins by solving two limiting cases,  = 0 and  = 1. A quick comparison of the two cases facilitates a simple discussion to highlight the intuition of key results. The solution and analysis for the general case  ∈ [0 1] are also included at the end.
Compare Two Limiting Cases
In this case, inshoring clerical work is impossible, and all clerks strictly prefer living in cities.
Thus,   = 0, and the city developer's profit maximization problem reduces to
Solving the first-order conditions and using   = 0 and Eq. (2), we have
This transfer internalizes the externality of knowledge spillovers because it equals the difference between the social and private marginal productivity. Thus, the equilibrium is optimal. The developer's zero-profit condition and Eq. (4) together imply that
Then, Eqs. (2) and (5) and   = 0 determine the equilibrium allocation, which in turn determines the equilibrium wages and transfer. τ = 1 Inshoring is frictionless in this case. All clerks strictly prefer living in rural areas because they can earn as much as if they were in cities, and they need not pay the urban cost of living. Thus,  = 0
and  =  . The developer's problem reduces to
Finding the equilibrium is analogous to the case of  = 0. After deriving Eq. (4) and
the rest of the solution can be determined.
Comparison To facilitate comparison, I attach a subscript 0 to the equilibrium elements derived from the  = 0 case and a subscript 1 to those from the  = 1 case. A new technology that increases the proportion of deliverable inshored services from 0 to 1 not only leads to geographic fragmentation of production, but also has effects on segregation, city size, average rent, output and welfare.
Increasing  from 0 to 1 changes the economy from complete integration to complete segregation.
From the perspective of how production is organized spatially, this is a change from no geographic fragmentation to complete geographic fragmentation of production (functional specialization). This is because when  = 1, rural clerks can earn as much as if they were in cities, but they need not pay commuting costs and rent. Thus, clerks strictly prefer rural areas to cities.
The city size increases when  increases from 0 to 1 because
given  ∈ (0 1). Since the First Welfare Theorem holds, we can use the social planner's view to explain why city size increases. The intuition is as follows: Adding a manager into the city when a clerk leaves, the city size does not change, and the total commuting cost remains the same. However, there are more knowledge spillovers in the city because the population of managers has increased. As a result, the marginal benefit of agglomeration increases and outweighs the marginal cost of congestion at the original city size. Thus, city size should increase by adding even more managers. The larger city size then implies a higher average rent in the city and higher aggregate output of the economy.
As  increases from 0 to 1, clerks are strictly better off because
In the new equilibrium, clerks not only save on commuting costs and rent by living in rural areas, but also earn higher wages because the higher level of knowledge spillovers makes producers more productive.
However, managers may be either better or worse off. Although managers earn higher wages at  = 1, they also need to pay a higher urban cost of living. 20 Nevertheless, increasing  from 0 to 1 unambiguously decreases welfare inequality, which is defined as the ratio of managers' welfare to clerks', because
Here,
1−
 reflects how welfare inequality depends upon the economy's relative supply of clerks to managers, and the change in the ratio from To see this, let us consider the following facts. First, both types of workers earn a constant share of the economy's aggregate output. The share is  for managers and 1 −  for clerks. Second, the aggregate urban cost of living is a constant proportion, 2, of the aggregate output. Half of this cost is aggregate congestion (commuting costs), and the other half is aggregate rent that eventually becomes part of managers' income through developers' transfer payments.
Most importantly, when the economy is completely integrated ( = 0), all workers share equally the aggregate urban cost of living. Thus, a  proportion of this cost is paid by managers, and the remaining 1 −  proportion is paid by clerks. However, when the economy is completely segregated ( = 1), the 20 Note that
where
As a result, managers may be either better or worse off. In a numerical example with  = 066 and  = 02, the new technology makes managers better off if  = 03, but it makes them worse off if  = 05.
entire aggregate urban cost of living is paid by managers, while clerks do not pay any. This is why the new technology decreases welfare inequality.
In summary, the new technology that facilitates inshoring benefits clerks because it allows them to access the high productivity in cities without paying the urban cost of living. Eliminating communication friction makes the marginal productivity of rural clerks as high as their urban counterparts, and living in rural areas saves on urban living costs. This generates the sorting of clerks into rural areas and leads to complete segregation. Because accommodating clerks, who do not contribute to knowledge spillovers, in cities is no longer a constraint, cities are able to increase in size and productivity (knowledge spillovers).
Through inshoring, rural clerks can further benefit from this additional higher productivity. On the contrary, managers may not necessarily benefit from the sorting. Although they can obtain higher incomes, they must also pay higher urban living costs. Finally, welfare inequality is mitigated because there is a redistribution of who pay the aggregate congestion costs and who are the ultimate sources of the developer's rental revenues, which are used to fund the transfer payments; clerks do not pay these at all after the sorting.
One might suspect that the above welfare implication is driven by the functions of city developers.
With transfer payments, managers are seemingly landlords since they ultimately receive all rental revenues. Thus, one might suspect that the welfare inequality is mitigated just because clerks no longer need to "subsidize" managers as  increases from 0 to 1. Nevertheless, this suspicion is not borne out in an alternative modeling approach-self-organization, which is typically found in the literature, e.g., Anas (1992) and Venables (2005) . Under this approach, city formation is due to atomistic decisions of workers and firms, but not actions of city developers. Henderson and Becker (2000) extensively study and compare equilibrium outcomes of self-organization versus assuming city developers. They show that the optimum can be achieved in the equilibrium with symmetric cities if a proactive welfare-maximizing government must evolve once a city is formed through atomistic decisions of individuals, implying the results presented above are all obtainable in this alternative model environment. In the absence of proactive government, the size of self-organized cities is not optimal. Nevertheless, it is found that the welfare result of inshoring still holds in this environment, even when managers and clerks each own an equal share of land. A simple model is sketched, and the results are discussed in Appendix B.
General Case
The solution for the general case in which  ∈ [0 1] and the propositions about how a marginal increase in  affects the model economy are presented here for completeness. The intuition of the propositions is fairly similar to that in the previous discussion.
In the developer's problem (Eq. 3), the non-negative constraints are not binding when  is in the following range:
When  ∈ (  ), the equilibrium is characterized by partial segregation: Clerks can be found in cities as well as rural areas. Solving the developer's problem, we have
and
where  denotes the ratio of clerks to managers in the city. The equilibrium value of this ratio is a decreasing function in  :
Together with Eq. (2) and the first-order conditions of the firm's profit maximization problem, Eqs. (8), (9) and (10) determine the equilibrium allocation, wages and transfer. The next two propositions concern the impact of a marginal increase in  when  ∈ (  ).
Proposition 1 When  ∈ (  ), a marginal increase in  increases the number of clerks in rural areas.
In addition, city size and average rent increase.
Proof. Let  denote the total number of clerks in rural areas. We have  = 1 −  − . Since   0,
It is not difficult to verify that ∀ ∈ (  ),   0. Since the city population increases with  , so will the average rent.
Proposition 2 When  ∈ (  ), a marginal increase in  decreases the welfare inequality.
Proof. For the aggregate urban cost of living, 
Clearly, 
Conclusion
This paper examines inshoring. Empirically, the paper shows that the BSS industry, which performs inshored business support services, grows substantially faster in small localities than it does in large cities.
The industry is increasingly concentrated in small localities and separated from its downstream industries, which are consistently more concentrated in large cities. The examination of growth determinants suggests that the primary reason for the small localities' success in attracting the BSS industry may be the less expensive support workers there. Additionally, it is found that the geographic separation between support and non-support jobs/workers also occurs on a broad scope. The examination of internal migration shows that the support workers are increasingly likely to leave large cities and migrate to small localities relative to non-support workers.
This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model that predicts the above empirical findings.
More importantly, the model suggests that inshoring benefits support workers relative to managers, thus mitigating welfare inequality. This implication stands in stark contrast to the offshoring literature, which 21 When  ≥  , we have often predicts that offshoring may make domestic support workers worse off. Despite certain stylization, the model does shed light on how inshoring could affect where people live and how well they live, and both these results are obtainable under the alternative modeling approach of self-organization. The possibility for support workers to work for urban firms without bearing urban costs is the key.
The result on welfare inequality relies on the assumption of mobile labor. If workers cannot move in response to adverse demand shifts (Blanchard and Katz, 1992 , show that this is unlikely to be the case),
urban support workers will get hurt when new technology shifts the demand for support workers to rural areas. Then, the welfare impact will be in line with the offshoring literature. Ping Wang, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and feedback. I also thank Tomoya Mori for insightful discussion that will help my future research. I acknowledge Singapore MOE's AcRF Tier congestion, subject to the feasibility constraints. The problem can be written as
Using  to denote the city's clerks-to-managers ratio, the problem reduces to
The first-order conditions with respect to  and  are
respectively, when the solution is interior. The conditions indicate tradeoffs between gaining productivity and causing congestion for choosing a larger city size, holding fixed , and between saving communication friction and creating congestion for putting more clerks in the cities, holding fixed . These two equations identify the unique interior solution of ( ).
Using the bounds of the inequality constraints of  in the above maximization problem, we can derive the range of  (Eq. 7) in which Eq. (10) . It is not difficult to verify that the rest of the optimal and equilibrium allocations are also identical throughout the full range of  . Thus, the equilibrium is the optimum.
Appendix B. Self-organized cities without proactive governments
This appendix sketches a model with self-organized cities in the absence of proactive governments. A comparison of  = 0 and  = 1 cases also indicates the welfare implication that clerks benefit more from inshoring than managers. The model elements are kept identical to those in the main text for simplicity, except three modifications. First, cities are self-organized through individuals' atomistic decisions. Second, each city's total rent  2 4 is equally distributed to its residents who take on equal ownership of land; every resident receives 4. Third, the utility function remains linear, but the indirect utility is translated by  units. Thus, city managers, city clerks and rural clerks' levels of indirect utility are
respectively, and the second term in the first two equations is the urban living cost net of rental income.
Because the large model economy can facilitate a continuum of cities, the cities are symmetric in equilibrium, and managers and clerks must be indifferent between an established city with a population  and a potential city with an infinitesimal number of residents (see Henderson, 1974 , for a discussion of this fact). The indifference condition of managers can determine the equilibrium number of managers in the established cities, and the potential city's ratio of clerks to managers can adjust to hold the indifference condition of clerks.
When  = 0, inshoring is impossible. All clerks are in cities, and the market clearing conditions (Eq.
2) imply  = ,  = (1 − )  and   = 0. Let  denote the number of managers in the potential city and   denote the clerks-to-managers ratio there. The presence of managers in the potential site does attract some clerks to the place because given the number of managers, the marginal productivity of clerks goes to infinity when   → 0. The managers and clerks' indifference conditions mentioned earlier
and the rest of the equilibrium can then be solved. Since  = ,    and   1, the comparison between Eqs. (5) 
and the rest of the equilibrium can then be determined.
Attach the equilibria of the  = 0 and  = 1 cases with subscripts 0 and 1, respectively. The change of  from 0 to 1 increases city size because
More importantly, the clerks' indirect utility increases because
as  1   0 . Since  1 =  0 = , inshoring makes the clerks better off relative to the managers. 250k and below
